




     Abstract — The objective of this paper is to provide a 
psychological perspective on Zhu Xi (ZX) and Dai Zhen (DZ) 
views about human nature, by comparing the potential 
implications of their views on an agent's moral cultivation.  To 
help frame this objective, I will ask and answer the following 
question:  if one commits to ZX who holds the view that human 
nature is innately good, although obscured, versus if one holds 
DZ's view that while human nature has the potential for good but 
it is unformed or unknown (i.e., no original nature)  then what 
are some of the possible implications for self love, sympathy, 
hope, forgiveness, and spontaneity that are relevant 
considerations, some of which have been noted by ZX and DZ, 
for the advance of an agent's moral cultivation. 
The implications of ZX's commitment to human nature being 
innately good could entail the following:  despite an agent’s 
obscurities, because his nature is good, he is lovable and he can 
be hopeful that he can shed off his obscurities via proper moral 
cultivation.  Spontaneity is encouraged as an integral part of an 
agent's moral self-cultivation.  His self-responsibility, hinges on 
his ability to use the instrumentality of moral cultivation, for 
which he would need the assistance of a moral teacher.  There is a 
greater capacity for forgiveness because of the presumption that 
the human nature is inherently good.  He can sympathize and 
extend concern for others, in part, because others' nature is also 
good.  ZX's view may potentially carry a risk of excess and a risk 
of expecting mainly the good, but not the unknown.  
Alternatively, implications for DZ's commitment to no original 
human nature, entails the following:  DZ's view is likely more 
conducive to expecting and embracing the unknown, which 
potentially makes DZ's philosophy more practical, because we 
live in a world where we often encounter unknowns and 
unfamiliar people.  Self-love is a prerequisite to know love before 
one can love others.  A moral agent can be hopeful because his 
potential is good, and it will not be a lost opportunity in light of 
the constitutive essence of moral cultivation.  Despite DZ 
appearing to be against spontaneity, he is only against the kind of 
spontaneity that could be hurtful to others as does ZX.  Lastly, I 
argue that DZ's view could result in a broader and more 
practical commitment to sympathy.  Compared to ZX, I argue 
that DZ’s view could have a potential risk of lower self-
responsibility and risk of resistance to self-forgiveness, which 
does not arise out of DZ’s views about the human nature per se, 
but rather stems from DZ's bias towards externalized morality.   
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 In self-love (not to be confused with selfishness), I can have 
self-acceptance, self-trust, and self-respect.  In sympathy, I 
can learn to understand and feel the world from the 
perspective of others. With self-love and sympathy, I can 
accept, respect, care for, and have love for others [1]-[3][9].  
In hope, I can be optimistic despite my encounters with the 
unknowns and life challenges.  Everyone makes mistakes, and 
if I can forgive myself for my mistakes, I can forgive others 
and believe that I too can be forgiven by others.  In 
spontaneity that is not harmful, I can get to know myself and 
self-cultivate.  I chose self-love, sympathy, hope, forgiveness, 
and spontaneity since some of such considerations have been 




 ZX viewed human nature to be innately good but obscured, 
which can be cleared through moral cultivation.[4]  DZ 
viewed human nature as having the potential to be good 
through moral cultivation, but held that human nature is 
neither bad nor good (i.e., no original-nature).  DX's view is 
closer to the idea that human nature is unformed or unknown, 
with a potential for goodness that can be constitutionally 
developed via moral cultivation.[3][4] 
 In summary, the objective of this paper is to answer the 
following question:  if one commits to the idea that human 
nature is innately good as opposed to being unformed or 
unknown (but with potential for the good), then what kind of 
commitments arise with respect to considerations such as self-
love, sympathy, hope, forgiveness, and spontaneity for one's 
development and moral cultivation, which are consistent with 
ZX's and DZ's views on human nature?  
 To bring this comparison into focus, it may be helpful to 
very briefly bring ZX's and DZ's views about desires in 
perspective:  (a) what are ZX's and DZ's general views on 
desires?  (b) Where could DZ and ZX agree and where could 
they disagree with respect to desires?  
A. ZX and DX's Views on Desires:   
 DZ viewed desires as integral components to moral 
cultivation, whereas ZX thought it is better to have fewer 
desires.[4][7]  Discussions about the detailed role of desires in 
ZX and DZ's philosophy is outside the scope of this paper.  
However, due to the interplay of desire and moral cultivation, 
I address this question in order to frame and highlight where 
DZ and ZX may have a common perspective regarding 
 
1 Detailed discussions about moral cultivation and its' pertinent factors are 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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desires, despite their differences in the general view. [5]  Both 
ZX and DZ aimed for their students to reach a tranquil and 
harmonious state of pattern, or principle, or the mean, or a 
sense of oneness.[5]-[8]  A follower of ZX starts with more 
desires, progressively converges towards fewer and less 
intense desires along a journey of moral cultivation, and 
ideally ends up with no unmet desires (i.e., if all desires are 
satisfied in the state of pattern, then there remains no desires 
in the pattern.) but the desire for harmony in that state of 
pattern itself.  ZX neither holds that a moral agent is best not 
to have any desires, nor that an agent should not have the 
kinds of desires that motivate his moral cultivation towards the 
pattern.  From ZX's point of view, obscurities could distort or 
block an agent's real and deeper needs and desires. For 
example, an agent may believe that he needs or desires power 
of money, respect of fame, fun of elaborate parties, and 
excitement of fast cars.  But upon awareness, he realizes that 
he wanted money and fame so people would notice him.  He 
held elaborate parties and wanted fast cars so he could have 
the company of others and experience the thrills that could 
help him forget that he is alone.  Upon reflections, he realizes 
that he just desired to be happy and be loved, and that he had 
an aversion to being alone.  With such an awareness, his 
desires for wealth, fame, parties, and thrills disappeared.  As 
such, he was left with fewer desires but more virtuous ones as 
in the desire for love and friendship.   
 From ZX's point of view, when a moral agent becomes 
aware, he gets in touch with his good nature from within, as 
the light of awareness shines away his obscurities. 
Alternatively from DX's perspective, through moral 
cultivation, an agent can develop his potential and create his 
good human nature.  Via moral cultivation, and agent's real 
and deeper desires can become aligned and congruent with the 
good human nature that he already possessed according to 
ZX's view, or with his good nature that can be developed and 
realized according to DZ's view.  
 Therefore, both ZX and DZ have this view in common with 
respect to desires:  a moral agent is motivated to reach a sense 
of oneness, where pattern is his desire and his desire is his 
pattern [4].  For both ZX and DZ, it is from the state of 
oneness where an agent's ultimate motivations originate.  In 
that state of oneness, the agent responds to the world perfectly 
morally with ease, without effort, automatically, 
spontaneously, and naturally, without thought and without 
deliberation, where there is harmony and moderation (i.e., 
neither insufficient nor excessive).  In the pattern the push and 
pull of desires are no longer, where an agent (following either 
of DZ or ZX views) meets joy and quietness.  For both ZX 
and DZ, an agent engaged in moral cultivation approaches the 
pattern, where and when more and more of the his desires 
meet satisfaction and the agent is left with fewer and fewer 
desires (until the pattern, where there remains no unmet 
desires).  
 In summary, because both ZX and DX agree that the 
ultimate goal for a moral agent is to reach the pattern, they 
both would likely agree with having (1) progressively fewer 
desires, and (2) an ideal final state of desirelessness, which is 
an ultimate goal of a moral agent. 
B.  Cases that  ZX and DZ could  Agree about Morality or 
Immorality of Certain Desires  
 DZ and ZX would likely agree that certain desires are 
immoral (i.e., desires that motivate hurting one's self or others, 
and let us call this the upper zone), and they would likely 
agree that certain desires are moral (i.e., desire to shelter and 
nourish self and one's family, and let us call this the lower 
zone).  I will focus my discussions for this paper in the zone 
where DZ and XZ may differ and let us call this the middle 
zone. 
 It is likely that ZX and DZ would agree in rejecting desires 
that motivate obvious hurtful acts such as killing (not in self 
defense), torturing, assault, battery, (falsely) imprisoning, 
defaming, cheating, stealing, or other obvious hurtful actions.   
 Furthermore, ZX and DZ would likely agree in approving 
desires that motivate a person in seeking satisfaction of his 
basic needs such as proper nourishment, seeking shelter, and 
making money to provide for his needs and his family’s 
welfare, etc.  ZX and DZ would likely agree that certain basic 
human needs should be met before an agent can commit and 
be reasonably expected to progress in his moral cultivation. 
 Now let us designate an area where there could be potential 
disagreement between ZX and DZ, and call this the middle 
zone, where an agent may be faced with (i.e., neither the upper 
nor the lower zones) for example:  Forgiveness in ways one 
deals with mistakes of self and mistakes of others; the role of 
hope and being loveable towards self and others; the role of 
self-responsibility and the interplay between caring for self 
and caring for others; the role of being sympathetic as opposed 
to unsympathetic in situations when one could be indifferent 
and unhelpful to others; handling conflicts within one’s circle 
of care (i.e., with parents, children, spouse, neighbor, and 
governor); the point at which desires are excessive with 
respect to tasty vs. normal food or expensive vs. good attire or 
adequate vs. fancy house or ambition vs. becoming fame; or 
the role of spontaneity in desires and motivations in moral 
development. 
 To summarize and before I delve into the discussion 
section, note the following: (1) the primary aim of the next 
discussion section is to address the middle zone, where ZX 
and DZ might disagree in lieu of their different perspectives 
about human nature, (2) the discussion section exclude the 
kind of cases where ZX and DZ could likely agree upon the 
morality or immorality of agents desires and motivation, (3) I 
would assume that ZX and DZ have more in common about 
the kind of desires that help motivate one's moral cultivation, 
and that both ZX and DZ share the same ultimate, which is to 
have fewer unmet desires over time, and (4) there are other 
factors beyond self-love, sympathy, hope, forgiveness, and 
spontaneity that are pertinent to moral cultivation.  To keep 
the scope of this report contained, I limit my analysis to a 
narrow set of considerations for moral cultivation, some of 
which have been noted by DZ and ZX, such as sympathy, self-
love, spontaneity.  
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A.  What are the Moral Cultivation Implications of ZX's View 
that Human Nature is Good but Obscured?   
 ZX asserts that while man’s innate nature is good, it has 
been obscured, which can be cleared via moral cultivation, 
education, and attending to certain rituals.  ZX holds that 
moral cultivations are like instruments (to help one shed off 
his obscurities, gain awareness, and become congruent with 
his innately good nature).[4]  As such moral cultivation has no 
constitutional role because he already possesses the good 
nature (e.g., moral cultivation does not create new blood as in 
creating more good because the person is born with all the 
good already; moral cultivation opens up the arteries and veins 
for the existing blood to flow and reach everywhere in the 
body).[3]  Let’s now address ZX’s view regarding human 
nature, with its implications in terms of self-love, hope, 
spontaneity,  forgiveness, and sympathy.  
 Self-love:  Despite having an innate nature that is good, an 
agent has obscurities that can prevent him from living the life 
that is congruent with his good nature.[1]  Since the good is 
loveable, the implication of ZX's view is that the agent can be 
hopeful that he is loveable (including by others) and that he 
can love himself.   
 Hope:  If an agent believed that his nature is good, then he 
just needs to shed off his obscurities to get back in touch with 
the good inside himself.  The consequence of such belief 
system is a hopeful one.  Such optimistic picture could give an 
agent some confidence that his moral cultivations and efforts 
could eventually result in a sense of oneness with the his good 
nature, no matter what, which would likely motivate and fuel 
his drive not to give up until he gets there.  
 Spontaneity: ZX was in favor of spontaneity.  A belief 
system such as ZXs' that views human nature as good could be 
more accommodating to spontaneity because proper 
spontaneity can facilitate moral self-cultivation, and here is 
how: An agent may not be consciously aware of all his 
obscurities and shadows.  Thus, he can allow what is inside 
him to appear through spontaneity because (1) given that his 
inner nature is good, he does not need to be afraid of what is 
beneath his coat of obscurities; (2) although he could use a 
moral guide, such a teacher cannot possibly know what is 
inside him, thus he has no choice but to be responsible for his 
morality; and (3) the only way to strike out his obscurities is 
by shining the lights of awareness on them.  Thus, spontaneity 
is pivotal in the progress of an agent's moral self-cultivation.  
Just as a reminder, this examination pertains only to the cases 
in the middle zone.  (Spontaneity in self-evident  hurtful 
expressions or actions are rejected by both ZX and DZ).   
 Forgiveness: Generally speaking, there is a greater 
propensity to feeling of shame if an agent believed that his 
nature was bad, which could likely handicap his ability to 
forgive. For ZX, when an agent makes mistakes, it is not 
because he is bad but it is because he has these obscure coats 
that have distanced him from his good nature.  As such, it is 
more likely that he can forgive, believing that his and others' 
innate natures are good, and hence it is less likely for him to 
carry shame for his own mistakes or shame others for their 
mistakes.  There is potentially less dependence (regarding his 
mistakes) on decrees of a moral leader.  Hence, there is less 
likelihood of moral paralysis, if otherwise he had to await 
judgment of a religious leader, for example, to determine if he 
is good or bad or forgiven.   
 Sympathy: If a moral agent believed that human nature is 
good, he would be predisposed to also hold other people's 
nature as good.  For one to believe in the abundance of good 
natured people in the world, it would help him feel safer in the 
world (compared to a system of belief that view people's 
nature as bad, for example).  Such belief system in turn would 
more likely motivate him to be open to reach-out, connect, 
care for others, and belong more to the world and its people.  
As such, he would be more inclined to sympathize with 
others.[2]   
 Risks with ZX’s view of good human nature:   
 (1) Risk of Excess:  If an agent has a guarantee this nature is 
good, then is it possible that he might not try hard enough to 
shed off his obscurities to uncover his good nature sooner?  If 
he believes that he is good, is there a risk that he may take 
being loveable for granted and become selfish?  If he believes 
that he is supposed to have been good because of his innately 
good human nature, how likely is it for him to blame his 
caretakers for his obscurities or carry bitterness towards them, 
and not take responsibility?  If an agent believes that others 
are good in nature, just like him, is there a greater risk that he 
might be disposed to be overly trusting or enmesh with 
strangers that he meets?  Because an agent believes that he is 
good, could there be a higher tendency that he may 
overindulge himself by being overly spontaneous because he 
believes that nothing bad could come out of it. The risks of 
excess addressed here are for cases in the middle zone, where 
a serious moral agent with the belief that he possesses 
obscurities, could cultivate the proper internal guards against 
such risks and be motivated enough to stay alert and diligent 
to rid himself of obscurities sooner than later.   
 (2) Risk of anticipating only the good, not the bad, and not 
the unknown:  There is an appeal to ZX’s view that human 
nature is good innately.  An agent can anticipate and accept 
himself because his nature is good.  Moreover, he can 
anticipate and accept the good in others (who by design have 
good natures like his).  The real world will likely present some 
appearance of bad and some unknown to us.  Part of an agent's 
moral cultivation should involve the skills in anticipating and 
morally dealing with the appearing bad and the unknown.  Is 
there more risk of being  less equipped to (morally) deal with 
the unfamiliar and the unknown in  ZX's belief system that 
believes and anticipates only the innately good human nature 
that may be obscured?  Comparatively, while I would argue 
that DZ's belief system could better prepare a moral agent to 
embrace the unknown and the unfamiliar, committing to ZX's 
view does not clearly make an agent ill-equipped to do the 
same. 
B.  What are the Moral Cultivation Implications of DZ's View 
that Although Human Nature has the Potential for Good, 
but it is Unformed and Unknown (i.e.,  has no Original 
Nature)?   
 DZ viewed human nature as having the potential to be 
good:  but he thought that an agent's nature was unformed and 
unknown in that it is not pre-determined as either good or bad.  
Through proper moral cultivate (constitutive) an agent could 
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develop his potential and create the good.  For DZ, moral 
cultivation, education and proper rituals can generate the good 
just like nutrition can generate new (good) blood in the 
body.[3]  It is of note that DZ's view is closer to one that 
embraces a human nature that is more fluid, plastic, and 
moldable, which has a common sense appeal.  Moreover, the 
implications of DZ’s views on human nature can potentially 
be significant, which is to anticipate and embrace the 
unknown, and this point will be discussed further.   
 DZ held that a moral agent could not give love to others, 
unless he has learned to love himself.  Given that DZ held that 
one's nature is unknown (or unformed), then one would learn 
not only to love himself but also to love the unknown about 
himself.  As such, he would likely be more predisposed to be 
accepting and to love others whose nature is also unknown 
like his.  It can be argued that one may be more accepting and 
open to what is different from us, when one has grown up in a 
belief system that embraces the human nature as being 
unknown or unformed.  Outside our communities, most of the 
world presents itself to us as an unknown.  Most people who 
we first meet come to us as unfamiliar, different, and as 
unkowns.  Our ability to experience and embrace the unknown 
can be an indispensible resource for our moral cultivation with 
respect to the people we meet.  One could argue that dealing 
with or embracing the unknown can be anxiety and fear 
provoking.  DZ's view that human nature has the potential for 
good should take at least some of such anxiety or fear off the 
table.  Some anxiety about dealing with unknowns may be a 
good thing for it can help fuel one's healthy tension to be more 
diligent in our moral endeavors involving others.  Again, note 
that we are in the middle zone, and the fear and the anxiety 
about for example hurtful and harmful acts of self and others 
do not enter the equation of this discussion.  Let’s now address 
the implications for DZ's human nature as it pertains to self-
love, hope, spontaneity, forgiveness, and sympathy: 
 Self-love:  DZ held that one has to love himself first, before 
one can learn what love is, and only then he would be able 
give love to others.[3]  As noted earlier, DZ's endorsement of 
self-love combined with his view about the unknown human 
nature (with the potential for good) can have the implications 
of enabling an agent to extend that kind of love to the 
unknowns in the outside world [1].  In real life, an agent's 
moral teacher is likely neither next to him all the time nor 
available for consultation real-time. As such, in his day-to-day 
affairs, an agent may be faced with matters he does not know.  
An agent with a belief system that human nature is unknown 
or unformed may develop more self-sufficient skills to interact 
with people he encounters who are unknown to him at first, as 
compared to taking a leap of faith that everyone's nature is 
good before he even met them.  Believing to anticipate and 
embrace the unknown could also condition a moral agent to 
perhaps pause to wonder, and handle the unknown, even with 
appearances of good or bad, with more patience.   
 Hope:  For any adult whose upbringing and life 
circumstances have conditioned him with certain belief system 
and character traits, should some moral teacher then wipe his 
past clean or build on who he is already?  Following DZ, 
although the agent starts with an unformed nature that has the 
potential for the good, his potential is not the kind to "use it or 
lose it".  Constitutive role of moral cultivation makes room for 
the good to grow as part of humanity's nature.  Potential for 
good will not be a lost opportunity, and this is hopeful.  
Because the agent has self-love, he expects and accepts all of 
himself believing that it is possible that he has some unknown 
and good inside that can grow.  Even if he may have 
developed some improper beliefs or traits, they can be 
displaced with the good via moral cultivation (which is 
constitutive in DZ's view), which is an optimistic and hopeful 
perspective about nature of humanity. 
 Spontaneity:  Contrary to ZX’s view, DZ may seem to be 
against spontaneity.[4]  I suggest otherwise, and here is why: 
neither ZX nor DZ would be in favor of the kind of 
spontaneity that embodies hurtful others-directed (as opposed 
to self-directed feelings) that are reactive, unpredictable, and 
self-centered.  DZ supported the role of desires and emotions 
in moral cultivation, and thus it is less likely that he would 
have held a broad objection towards spontaneity (which 
mostly applies to or is invoked by emotions)?  I suggest that 
DZ would not likely reject the kind of spontaneity that is 
productive and instrumental for moral self-cultivation, but DZ 
would object to the kind of spontaneity that comes at the 
expense of hurting and harming others.  Neither ZX nor DZ 
would endorse the kind of spontaneity that involves 
“rancorous emotional attitudes that are very different from the 
emotional harmony that neo-Confucians believed in".[8]  
Again, note that this examination of DZ's and ZX's views 
about spontaneity are centered on cases in the middle zone 
(not upper and not the lower zone that were framed earlier in 
the paper).  
 Forgiveness:  Although an agent may not have the good 
nature yet, he has the potential to make his nature good.  If 
along the way he makes mistakes, it can be because of his lack 
of awareness or knowledge (i.e., insufficient or improper 
cultivation) and hence he can be forgiven.  As noted, the 
mistakes and their respective forgiveness discussed here apply 
to cases in middle zone.  In lieu of the constitutive view 
regarding moral cultivation, an agent committed to DZ's view 
would likely rely more on guidance of a moral teacher to 
decipher the proper from the improper.  Accordingly, an agent 
could rely more on his teacher in order to be forgiven or not.  
Is there a risk of moral paralysis if the agent's moral teacher is 
not around or does not forgive him?  Could an agent here truly 
internalize forgiving himself or for that matter, others?  It 
seems that the risk of lower self-responsibility and risk of 
greater inability to forgive self and others would not stem 
from DZ belief system about human nature per se, but it stems 
from DZ view that in order for the human nature to realize his  
full potential for the good, he might need to rely more on the 
guidance of a moral authority. One might argue that the 
instrumental role of moral cultivation in ZX's belief system 
could  engender a very different but be proportionally as risky 
to the aims of self-responsibility and forgiveness. 
 Sympathy:  From the time one leaves the womb until he 
enters the grave, he encounters unknowns (or things and 
others that are different from her).[3]  As mentioned earlier, it 
is more likely that learning to expect, accept, and love the 
unknown and that which is different disposes a moral agent to 
be sympathetic and gain a broader commitment to others-
perspective taking.  Combined with DZ's view about loving 
one's self so to be able to love others plus the constitutive 
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essence of DZ's moral cultivation, here is a natural appeal to 
DZ's belief system:  Starting from accepting the unknown 
parts of one’s self, an agent can be more predisposed with a 
natural commitment to accepting the unknown parts of 
others.[2][9]  This can potentially enables one to, more 
seamlessly, expect that which is different and the unknown 
parts of the world including the different people he meets 
along the way.  In this regards, DZ’s view  can be more 
equipped to facilitate the cultivation of an agent in becoming 
more open minded, and more sympathetic towards (i.e., the 
unknown or unformed natured and different) people.   
 In ZX’s view, people are innately good in nature but 
possess obscurities which can be shed off, after they become 
aware of them.  Where a moral agent starts from a core belief 
that other's nature is only good, then he may run the risk of 
expecting only the good.  Comparatively, committing to DZ's 
view, a moral agent may be more likely disposed to embrace 
(and be more sympathetic with regards to) the unknown and 
the unfamiliar and ones who appear to be different from him.   
III. CONCLUSION 
 This paper aims to provide a psychological perspective on 
ZX and DZ's views about human nature via comparing the 
implications of such view on moral cultivation.   To frame this 
objective, the aim of this paper is to answer the following 
question:  if one commits to ZX’s belief system who holds that 
human nature is innately good (although obscured) versus if 
one commits to DZ’s belief system that although human 
nature has the potential for the good but it is unformed and 
unknown (no original-nature), then what are some of the 
implications of those belief systems that are relevant to moral 
cultivation? The alignment and consistency of DZ and ZX's 
views about human nature and their implications are examined 
in terms of self-love, sympathy, hope, forgiveness, and 
spontaneity, which have been noted by both DZ and ZX.  
 For ZX's side, I hoped to have made the following case:  
Despite a moral agent’s obscurities, because his  nature is 
good, he is lovable and he can be hopeful that he can shed off 
his coat of obscurities.  Spontaneity is encouraged as an 
integral part of his moral cultivation.  His self-responsibility 
hinges on his ability to use the instrumentality of his  moral 
cultivation, for which he may need the assistance of a moral 
teacher.  There is self-forgiveness given the presumption that 
mistakes of an agent who is good in nature is forgivable.  He 
can sympathize and be more forgiving with others because 
others’ nature is also good like his.  I discussed some of the 
possible risks with ZX's views on human nature including risk 
of excesses and risk of anticipating only the good, not the bad, 
and not the unknown.  
 For DZ's side, I aimed to make the case that his view is 
more conducive to expecting and embracing the unknown and 
that which is different.  This aspect of DZ's view is attractive 
in its practicality and common sense respect, because we live 
in a world of mostly unknowns, where we encounter people 
that may appear different from us. A moral agent can be 
hopeful because his  potential is good and it will not be a lost 
opportunity. Because moral cultivation is constitutive, he can 
develop his potential and create the good in his nature.  
Despite DZ being against spontaneity, I argue that DZ was 
only against the kind of spontaneity that may be self-centered 
and hurtful to others, as was ZX.  Compared to ZX, I show 
that DZ runs the potential risk of having lower self-
responsibility and risk of greater inability to forgive one’s self 
and others, which does not stem from DZ's views on human 
nature per se, but it stems from DZ bias towards externalized 
morality.  If one does not learn to love himself, he cannot love 
others.   Hence, self-love is a prerequisite to being able to 
love, care, and sympathize with others.  Lastly, I argue that 
DZ's view about human nature could result in a more practical 
commitment to sympathy. 
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